The answer is less insurance, not more, and private insurance, not public. In the long run, those health savings accounts are probably the best solution. In the interim, the single most effective way to cut health care costs in a hurry would be to eliminate the tax deduction for employer supplied health insurance. That deduction leads to immense overuse of health care resources, especially by rich people. That’s one good reason to eliminate the deduction, and here’s another: People would start shopping for insurance on their own instead of taking whatever their employers offer, which would make the insurance companies more responsive to consumer demands.
It saddens me that support for universal coverage and a public option has become, in many circles, a sort of litmus test for compassion and caring about the poor. It particularly saddens me to hear the president say that “What we face is a moral issue; at stake are not just the details of policy, but fundamental principles.” It’s the details of policy that change people’s lives. The moral imperative is to get them right.
Saturday, October 31, 2009
Friday, October 30, 2009
Adam Smith: Moral Philosopher
This 2000 piece by James R. Otteson is worth a read.
Otteson observes about The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
Smith’s analysis of the way in which people and communities come to have common moral standards is intriguing—and, indeed, may in large part be true. This alone would recommend it for serious consideration. But Smith’s examination of human morality reveals a model for explaining the development and maintenance of large-scale human institutions generally—which would mean that the book’s import is yet greater than initially thought. I call Smith’s model a “marketplace model.” Let me sketch it briefly, drawing on the discussion so far.
First, Smith argues that moral judgments, along with the rules by which we render them, develop in the way I have described, without an overall, pre-arranged plan. They arise and grow into a shared, common system of morality—a general consensus regarding the nature of virtue, or what Smith calls propriety and merit—on the basis of countless individual judgments made in countless particular situations.
Second, Smith argues that as we grow from infants to children to adults we develop increasingly sophisticated principles of action and judgment, which enable us to assess and judge an increasingly diverse range of actions and motivations.
Third, what seem when we are children to be isolated and haphazard interactions with others lead as we grow older to habits of behavior; as adults the habits solidify into principles that guide what we call our “conscience.”
Fourth, people’s interests, experiences, and environments change slowly enough to allow long-standing associations and institutions to arise, which give a firm foundation to the rules, standards, and protocols that both set the parameters for the initial creation of these associations and in turn are supported by them. (These “associations” would today include everything from Elks clubs, YMCAs, and Boy Scouts, to the American Medical Association, the National Academy of Sciences, and even the Catholic Church.)
Smith next argues that the development of personal moral standards, of a conscience and the impartial spectator procedure, and of the accepted moral standards of a community all depend on the regular associations people make with one another.
Otteson observes about The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
Smith’s analysis of the way in which people and communities come to have common moral standards is intriguing—and, indeed, may in large part be true. This alone would recommend it for serious consideration. But Smith’s examination of human morality reveals a model for explaining the development and maintenance of large-scale human institutions generally—which would mean that the book’s import is yet greater than initially thought. I call Smith’s model a “marketplace model.” Let me sketch it briefly, drawing on the discussion so far.
First, Smith argues that moral judgments, along with the rules by which we render them, develop in the way I have described, without an overall, pre-arranged plan. They arise and grow into a shared, common system of morality—a general consensus regarding the nature of virtue, or what Smith calls propriety and merit—on the basis of countless individual judgments made in countless particular situations.
Second, Smith argues that as we grow from infants to children to adults we develop increasingly sophisticated principles of action and judgment, which enable us to assess and judge an increasingly diverse range of actions and motivations.
Third, what seem when we are children to be isolated and haphazard interactions with others lead as we grow older to habits of behavior; as adults the habits solidify into principles that guide what we call our “conscience.”
Fourth, people’s interests, experiences, and environments change slowly enough to allow long-standing associations and institutions to arise, which give a firm foundation to the rules, standards, and protocols that both set the parameters for the initial creation of these associations and in turn are supported by them. (These “associations” would today include everything from Elks clubs, YMCAs, and Boy Scouts, to the American Medical Association, the National Academy of Sciences, and even the Catholic Church.)
Smith next argues that the development of personal moral standards, of a conscience and the impartial spectator procedure, and of the accepted moral standards of a community all depend on the regular associations people make with one another.
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Student For Liberty Challenges Michael Moore
On Monday, Sept 28, Michael Moore spoke at George Washington University about his new film, Capitalism: A Love Story. One of the leaders of the GWU Liberty Society, Chad Swarthout (who is an active member of Students For Liberty, formerly a leader in the London School of Economics Hayek Society while studying abroad, leader in the DC Forum for Freedom, and all around great guy), managed to get up and question Michael Moore.
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Saturday, October 24, 2009
Friday, October 23, 2009
What's an Apology Worth?
I'm sorry, I really am. Here's the economics of apologies:
Saying sorry really does cost nothing, EurekAlert: Economists have finally proved what most of us have suspected for a long time – when it comes to apologizing, talk is cheap.
According to new research, firms that simply say sorry to disgruntled customers fare better than those that offer financial compensation. The ploy works even though the recipient of the apology seldom gets it from the person who made it necessary in the first place.
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